Showing posts with label gold lease rates. Show all posts
Showing posts with label gold lease rates. Show all posts

02 September 2015

Financial Media Wakes Up to 'Physical Tightness' In London Gold Bullion Market


How interesting that the Financial Times has finally noticed 'tentative signs of increased demand for bullion from consumers in emerging markets.'  You know, those obscure places with difficult names such as I-N-D-I-A and C-H-I-N-A.

It's not all that new of a phenomenon, mates.   Our friend Nick has been tracking it, and we have been talking about that here at Le Cafe, for a couple years now.  Well, maybe almost a decade.  See the charts below.

And we have also been hearing about 'physical tightness in the market for gold for immediate delivery.'  While the 'cost of borrowing gold has risen sharply in recent weeks.'

Even while the price of gold was shoved lower on the non-delivery paper markets of The Bucket Shop, helping to crater the deveopment and production of mining companies.

Sounds like borrowing gold for physical delivery is starting to be a dodgy business, a little hard to manage at such high leverage of claims to items.

Wait until people start realizing that there is a diminishing mix of deliverable and of 'borrowed gold' backing up a pyramid of derivatives and paper claims.   Is that the sound of a spoon scraping the bottom of the pot yet?

What happened to the theory of higher prices to relieve demand in excess of supply?

And where is that 'borrowed gold' coming from, by the by?  It must belong to someone, and they may even think it is safely tucked away while it is on its way to Asia via Switzerland.

If the LBMA has been doing what some think they have been doing with demand and available supply, then we haven't seen anything yet.

Never be the last one out of the pool.

But let's see how all this plays out.

Gold Demand from China and India Picks Up
By Henry Sanderson
Financial Times, London
Wednesday, September 2, 2015

London's gold market is showing tentative signs of increased demand for bullion from consumers in emerging markets, after the price of the precious metal fell to its lowest level in five years in July.

The cost of borrowing physical gold in London has risen sharply in recent weeks. That has been driven by dealers needing gold to deliver to refineries in Switzerland before it is melted down and sent to places such as India, according to market participants.

The rise "does indicate there is physical tightness in the market for gold for immediate delivery," said Jon Butler, analyst at Mitsubishi. ...

... For the remainder of the report:
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/eae18206-5154-11e5-b029-b9d50a74fd14.html



30 September 2013

Central Bank of Italy: Gold Is a Key Asset For Central Banks Because It Has No Counterparty Risk


"Gold is unique among assets, in that it is not issued by any government or central bank, which means that its value is not influenced by political decisions or the solvency of one institution or another."

Salvatore Rossi, Chief of the Central Bank of Italy, 30 Sept 2013

Bam!  Grazie mille, signore.

And that is why gold is the king of assets, Bernanke you great prune.

And thanks to Gordon Brown, the Brits have bugger all.  At least the Germans have a receipt from the Fed in die keksdose.

The other major European Central Banks (France and Germany) say in the second story below that "they will not sell their gold reserves, as they can provide a level of confidence, an element of diversification and can absorb some volatility from the central bank's balance sheet."

This implies that they are not going to account for their gold at an artificially low fixed price on their Balance Sheet, as the Federal Reserve does at the ludicrously out of date price of $45 per ounce.

But it is ironic that France confirms their gold leasing activities. If gold is an item on the balance sheet, one might expect a full disclosure of encumbrances and commitments for any variable balance sheet asset to be disclosed, ne c'est-pas? You know, any counterparty risks you may have accrued for a pittance of a yield on your premiere riskless asset.

And they will get that gold bullion back once it has been melted down and shipped to China how?
"Oh what a tangled web we weave,
When first we practise to deceive."

Sir Walter Scott, Marmion
Theory founders on the rocky shoals of reality once again. This may get even more interesting than I thought, once gold breaks and run higher again.  All those shorts to cover, and lease obligations to fulfill, and no one with bullion in size wishing to sell.  Quel dommage!

Have a pleasant evening.

Banca d'Italia-Les réserves d'or: un élément clé d'indépendance
 
 
ROME, Sept. 30  (Reuters) - Gold reserves are a key element of central bank independence, said an official of Banca d'Italia in a conference on Monday, undermining rumors of the sale of part of its bullion assets.

The crisis in the euro zone has triggered speculation that the central bank may have to sell some of its huge gold reserves to support its economy. Banca d'Italia has the fourth largest gold reserves among central banks in the world.

Central bank regulations prohibited this use of gold reserves [for retiring debt], but the concerns rose after a document from the European Commission claimed in April that Nicosia planned to raise about 400 million euros by sale of its gold surplus. (And see)

In a speech at the annual conference of the London Bullion Market Association, Salvatore Rossi, CEO of the Italian central bank, said that gold had a specific role in the central bank's reserves.

"Not only does it have essential characteristics that allow for diversification, particularly in financial markets that have been largely globalized, but it is also unique among assets because it is not issued by a government or central bank, which means that its value can not be influenced by political decisions or the solvency of an institution or another," he said.

"These features, combined with historical factors and psychological stress the importance of gold as part of the reserves of central banks," he said. "Gold supports the independence of central banks in their ability to (act) as the ultimate guarantor of national financial stability."

Read the entire article (in French) here

Banca d'Italia says gold reserves key to cenbank independence
Mon, Sep 30 13:23 PM EDT
By Jan Harvey and Clara Denina

ROME, Sept 30 (Reuters) - Keeping gold reserves is a key support to central banks' independence, an official from Banca d'Italia told a bullion industry conference on Monday, dampening talk that it might sell some of its holdings.

Speculation has emerged since the financial crisis hit the euro zone that Banca d'Italia might be pressured to leverage or even sell some of its huge gold reserves - the fourth largest among the world's central banks - to help prop up its economy.

Regulations covering central bank independence restrict them from using bullion reserves this way, but concerns grew after an assessment of Cypriot financing needs prepared by the European Commission showed Cyprus under pressure to sell gold to raise around 400 million euros (341.1 million pounds) to help finance its bailout.

In a keynote address to the London Bullion Market Association's annual conference, Salvatore Rossi, director general of the Italian central bank, told delegates that gold plays a special role in central banks' official reserves.

"Not only does it have the vital characteristic of allowing diversification, in particular when financial markets are highly integrated, in addition it is unique among assets in that it is not issued by any government or central bank, so its value cannot be influenced by political decisions or by the solvency of any institution," he said.

"These features, coupled with historic... and psychological reasons, stand in favour of gold's importance as a component of central bank reserves," he said. "Gold underpins the independence of central banks in their ability to (act) as the ultimate bearer of domestic financial stability."

Italy holds 2,451.8 tonnes of gold in its reserves. A slim majority of Italians polled by the World Gold Council in March believed their government should use the country's gold holdings to offset high public borrowing costs, although they did not believe they should sell them.

Italy used gold to collateralise bonds in 1974, when it received a $2 billion bailout from Germany's Bundesbank and put up 500 tonnes of metal as a collateral.

EUROPEAN BANKS WON'T SELL

Other European central banks including the Bank of France and the Bundesbank said at the conference that they will not sell their gold reserves, as they can provide a level of confidence, an element of diversification and can absorb some volatility from the central bank's balance sheet.

"We have no plan to sell gold," Bank of France Alexandre Gautier, director of market operations department, told delegates in a presentation. "We are still active in the lending market, but not retail loans. We can see some yields that are attractive, but we realise that we can't lend gold without collateral."

Number two holder Germany also said at the meeting that it will keep its 3,390 tonnes of gold. (This presumes they can find it, for now they are holding a bag of receipts for some of it - Jesse)

PRICE ACTION IMPACTS CENTRAL BANKS DECISION

Gold price volatility this year has impacted the buying decisions of emerging countries' central banks like Argentina, Juan Ignacio Basco, deputy general manager at the Central Bank of Argentina, said.

Bullion fell by $200 an ounce in two days in its sharpest slide in 30 years in April before hitting a three-year low in June and then regaining 13 percent from that level.

"It's very difficult to decide when to enter the market as we don't follow trends ... (but) the recent volatility in prices has changed the way we have look at gold," Basco said.

"That's why we have started with the product options because volatility in the market is not good for us."

Argentina slowly re-started to rebuild its gold reserves in 2000s after selling them at the bottom of the market in December 1997 to buy U.S. Treasuries. (Q. What do Argentina and England have in common?  Jess)  It currently holds 61.7 tonnes of the metal, representing seven percent of its assets.

"We are accumulating slowly ... and we have to move slowly," Basco said. "We must remember that we are like elephants." (And some are like dinosaurs. - Jess)

Read the entire story here



01 August 2013

A Forensic Investigation of Gold


This is interesting, but apparently somewhat tentative, which is understandable given the nature of the subject.

I am not in a position to assess it quite yet, but I thought it was worth sharing to see what you all might think. I intend to follow this closely and spend more time looking into it. Today I am preoccupied with the wonders of the healthcare system.

I find the opacity in these exchanges and funds to be somewhat frustrating as I am sure many do, as well as the lack of detailed independent audits and full and timely disclosure, especially with regard to what might be considered to be public information.

But still the effort can be made to untangle things as best we can.

Here is a summary of key points by Mr. Ferguson of the analysis.

"GLD was "funded" with gold leased out (sold) by the BoE and SNB.

With everything going on, not only are those entities no longer willing to provide supply, they're actually taking their gold back before it's too late.

Holders like Paulson and Soros are the "fly in the ointment" as they have a GLD claim on the same gold that the BoE and SNB claim as their own "leased" assets.

We are witnessing a managed, slow-burn "run" on the London vaults, where supposed "allocated" gold rests for entities worldwide but this gold has instead been leased out, not only to the GLD, but sold into the market and currently dangling around the necks and wrists of Asians as well as being recast into 1Kg Chinese bars."
Read the entire article here.

I would imagine it would be fairly easy for GLD to address any mistakes in this with a clear statement with regard to any claims or counterclaims on its bullion.


29 January 2013

Kitco Corrects Their Gold Lease Rates Error



Kitco has corrected the significant error in their gold lease rates.

They corrected it the day after gold options expiration.


Before



After








28 January 2013

Much Ado About Lease Rates - FOMC and Option Expiration


Here is the update from the LBMA on the Gold Forwards.

It shows little change, and even a slight increase today Monday.

The LBMA do not update LIBOR in real time, but do so with a lag. 

I did not see anything untoward in the LIBOR rates on another site, so I suspect that Kitco will be revising their charts sometime.

The only negative I see for gold is that this is an FOMC week.  And of course today is the February Option Expiration on the Comex.
The expiration date for the February 2013 options contract for Copper Option (HX), Gold Option (OG), and Silver Option (SO) is Monday, January 28, 2013.

I would not mind hearing an explanation for those Kitco gold lease prices chart from either Kitco or Sharefin.




27 January 2013

Kitco Shows Recent Plunge to Negative In Gold Lease Rates


Here is what they are showing.

I am wondering if Kitco did not use a bad LIBOR quote in calculating this.

As you may recall the lease rate calculation is LIBOR - GOFO (Gold Forward Offered Rates) = Lease Rate.

A drop in lease rates like this might presage a sell off attempt in gold, or an influx of leased gold to meet some short term delivery pressures or demands for allocation from unallocated sources.

Here is something I wrote about this in the past, when lease rates had dropped.


I suspect Kitco may have miscalculated the data by using a bad LIBOR number, but lets see what happens tomorrow, and I'll do the math myself if they do not correct this.

PS. Later, a reader informs me that he thinks they did miscalculate.  I will give it a day.






06 July 2012

Brown's Bottom: Why Gordon Brown Sold England's Gold On the Cheap To Bail Out the Banks


Although this is nothing new, as I and several others have reported this several times in the past, with a very nice documentary on it having been done by Max Keiser, this is still a very important article for two reasons.

First, it lays out rather nicely the gold panic of 1999 and Brown's Bottom, which is the low in the price of gold achieved by the dumping of 400 tons of gold into the world market at an artificially low price by the British government.

This was done apparently to bail out a bullion bank or two who were enormously and irretrievably caught short of gold by the carry trade.

Second, it provides a good description of the gold carry trade. When gold is leased out by a central bank, the bullion bank takes possession of it and sells it into the market, and invests the proceeds. At the end of the lease period, the bullion bank buys the gold bank in the open market and returns it to the central bank.

Although the gold likely never changes physical location in this process, the claim or title to the gold does change hands, although that change in claim may not be adequately reflected in the public records.

Although the author does not mention it here, there is some thought that the 'sale' of the central bank gold at private auction is in reality a paper transaction between the central bank and the bullion banks who are short leased gold from the bank, and are unable to return it without causing a price disruption in the world market.

This is something which could be easily cleared up with the kind of disclosure one might think is owed the people when their national heritage items are sold away by the government.

And again, although it is not mentioned in the article, Britain's gold depletion to save the private banks is infamous only because of the clumsy manner in which it was conducted. It is thought that several other European central banks have gold listed on their books which they no longer have, because of this pernicious habit of lending out the gold on the cheap to the banks, only to have it sold off in the market, never to return, leaving only a stack of paper promises.

And finally, the most intractable problem which the bullion banks face today is that no central bank has a stockpile of silver left with which to bail them out. So they are caught playing a shell game, robbing Peter to pay Paul, and living in dread of the day of reckoning when their schemes will be exposed, and the markets will go into default on their naked short positions.

Telegraph UK
Revealed: why Gordon Brown sold Britain's gold at a knock-down price
By Thomas Pascoe
5 July 2012

A great deal of Gordon Brown’s economic strategy would strike a sane man as troubling. Not a great deal was mysterious. The orgy of consumption spending, frequent extensions of the cycle over which he would “borrow to invest”, proclamations of the “end of boom and bust”: these are part of the armoury of modern politicians, of all political hues.

One decision stands out as downright bizarre, however: the sale of the majority of Britain’s gold reserves for prices between $256 and $296 an ounce, only to watch it soar so far as $1,615 per ounce today.

When Brown decided to dispose of almost 400 tonnes of gold between 1999 and 2002, he did two distinctly odd things.

First, he broke with convention and announced the sale well in advance, giving the market notice that it was shortly to be flooded and forcing down the spot price. This was apparently done in the interests of “open government”, but had the effect of sending the spot price of gold to a 20-year low, as implied by basic supply and demand theory.

Second, the Treasury elected to sell its gold via auction. Again, this broke with the standard model. The price of gold was usually determined at a morning and afternoon "fix" between representatives of big banks whose network of smaller bank clients and private orders allowed them to determine the exact price at which demand met with supply.

The auction system again frequently achieved a lower price than the equivalent fix price. The first auction saw an auction price of $10c less per ounce than was achieved at the morning fix. It also acted to depress the price of the afternoon fix which fell by nearly $4.

It seemed almost as if the Treasury was trying to achieve the lowest price possible for the public’s gold. It was.

One of the most popular trading plays of the late 1990s was the carry trade, particularly the gold carry trade.

In this a bank would borrow gold from another financial institution for a set period, and pay a token sum relative to the overall value of that gold for the privilege.

Once control of the gold had been passed over, the bank would then immediately sell it for its full market value. The proceeds would be invested in an alternative product which was predicted to generate a better return over the period than gold which was enduring a spell of relative price stability, even decline.

At the end of the allotted period, the bank would sell its investment and use the proceeds to buy back the amount of gold it had originally borrowed. This gold would be returned to the lender. The borrowing bank would trouser the difference between the two prices.

This plan worked brilliantly when gold fell and the other asset – for the bank at the heart of this case, yen-backed securities – rose. When the prices moved the other way, the banks were in trouble.

This is what had happened on an enormous scale by early 1999. One globally significant US bank in particular is understood to have been heavily short on two tonnes of gold, enough to call into question its solvency if redemption occurred at the prevailing price.

Goldman Sachs, which is not understood to have been significantly short on gold itself, is rumoured to have approached the Treasury to explain the situation through its then head of commodities Gavyn Davies, later chairman of the BBC and married to Sue Nye who ran Brown’s private office.

Faced with the prospect of a global collapse in the banking system, the Chancellor took the decision to bail out the banks by dumping Britain’s gold, forcing the price down and allowing the banks to buy back gold at a profit, thus meeting their borrowing obligations.

I spoke with Peter Hambro, chairman of Petroplavosk and a leading figure in the London gold market, late last year and asked him about the rumours above.

“I think that Mr Brown found himself in a terrible position,” he said.

“He was facing a problem that was a world scale problem where a number of financial institutions had become voluntarily short of gold to the extent that it was threatening the stability of the financial system and it was obvious that something had to be done.”

While the market manipulation which occurred when the gold reserves were sold was not illegal as the abuse at Barclays may have been, the moral atmosphere in which it took place was identical.

The crash which began in 2007 and endures still was the result of an abdication of responsibility across the financial sector. This abdication ranged from the consumer whose thirst for goods pushed him beyond into grave debt to a government whose lust for popularity encouraged it to do the same.

Responsibility is evaded by all bar those on whose shoulders it ought to rest. The gold panic of 1999 was expensively paid for by the British public. The one thing politicians ought to have bought with that money was a lesson in the structural restraints which needed to be placed on banks now that the principle that they were ultimately public liabilities had been established.

It was a lesson which could have acted to restrain all players in the credit market boom of the 2000s. It was a lesson which nobody learnt.



14 December 2011

The LIBOR-Gold Forwards Pain Index - Gold Lease Rates Plunged - More Than Meets the Eye



This is the reason for the ferocity of this sell off in my judgement, coupled of course with a general liquidation in stocks and other 'risk assets.'  I cannot help but notice that despite the message of panic, the SP futures remain in a fairly well defined trading range that goes back to late October.  The lower bound of its triangle is around 1180.

Maybe things will fall out of bed, and Europe will topple, but right now I smell a skunk.  And it is likely the offspring of BB and TG.

Central Banks were leasing gold for record low rates to the bullion banks like JP Morgan and HSBC. Silver lease rates also fell in sympathy.

As you may recall, LIBOR - GOFO (Gold Forward Offered Rates) = Lease Rate.

As can be seen from the last two charts showing the LIBOR GOFO spread, the lease rates reported in the press are a derived rate and actually represent the amount that can be earned from the gold carry trade.

I do not like to look at just the Lease Rate which is really just a calculated derivative like the 'spot price' based on the present value of the futures front month,  but at the two major components that constitute it.  Which one is driving the change in the spread, and why? 

As an aside, I do not think that the major bullion banks finance their gold leases through LIBOR anymore in these days of excess reserves and quantitative easing, but it is a useful reference for most others.  This tends to put a little more emphasis on the nominal level of the Gold Forwards Offered Rate.  But this is just my opinion and I could be wrong.

There is an obvious 'chicken and egg' argument embedded in this phenomenon.  For example, some might say that the high spread between GOFO and LIBOR makes it difficult for those who wish to short gold to obtain it since the price one pays to finance the deal is quite high.  I think this is Tom McClellan's hypothesis as well as some others. 

This is an interesting theory, because it seems to suggest that without the ability to borrow gold from central bank holdings and perhaps those others who can lease in large numbers like ETFs and not the spot market, shorting gold is not possible at these prices and the natural tendency of the clearing price is to stay the same or to increase.  This suggests more manipulation than market demand and supply.

I tend to think that the spreads widen as the bullion banks must borrow more heavily to support their short positions with some sort of physical backing.  When the pain of the spread becomes too great, they have the incentive to throw contracts at the paper price in a desperate effort to break the price and relieve the short term pressures. 

The 'informational campaign' by the bankers demimonde that surround these bear raids seems to support this hypothesis of a 'market operation.' The central banks are notorious for rescuing Primary Dealers who are in trouble.

I would tend to categorize this latter theory of mine as the LIBOR-Gold Forwards Pain Index.

But unfortunately I can see both sides of these theories.  I would just like to know who is motivated by leasing their gold in order to knock the price for some reason.  I know of only two groups like that:  the fiat central banks in order to help the bullion banks, and perhaps unallocated ETFs that do not particularly care what the price of gold may be as long as they can collect their fees.

"Nor can private counterparties restrict supplies of gold, another commodity whose derivatives are often traded over-the-counter, where central banks stand ready to lease gold in increasing quantities should the price rise."

Alan Greenspan, Congressional Testimony on Regulation of OTC Derivatives, 24 July 1998

The bullion banks use this leased gold as collateral for more fractional paper short sales, breaking the price trend and forcing liquidation. Their sales are done in the so-called Dr. Evil manner, of dumping large numbers of contracts on light markets.

There is also the liquidation factor from the collapse of MF Global, and the reluctance of small specs to engage in the futures markets at all because of capital risk and lack of confidence.

This allows the bullion banks to arrange for a big price swing that allows them to cover their short positions and also obtain other assets on the cheap such as mining companies.

Since the leased gold must be returned after a short term period, this is almost always a trading gambit, as opposed to outright net gold sales by the central banks which have virtually stopped in the past couple of years.

This at least is my take on what is happening. If this is correct we could see a repeat of the big market bottom and deep lows with a spring back as we have seen several times before.  And the magnitude of these swings may continue to increase as the sorcerer's apprentices continue to meddle with the real economy.

If the CFTC were to do their jobs, as the Europeans had done with banks like Citigroup who employed their 'Dr. Evil' trading strategy there, we would not have this type of harmful volatility in key commodity markets.

On these dips one would imagine that long term buyers are taking advantage of the low prices to acquire bullion and store it as a future hedge. As the bullion banks seek to return the borrowed gold, their demand attracts the momentum trading hedge funds that are now selling, so we see a big rally in the metals.  The big rally in the metals causes the LIBOR - Gold Forwards pain to increase, and so the banks cry to be rescued.  And so on it goes on, until something breaks.

The obvious artificiality of these price swings obscures the efficient allocation of capital, and the orderly operation of markets, not only in metals but in key commodities significant to the real economy. The CFTC and SEC apparently have the tools to correct this, but they choose not to do anything constructive for whatever reasons.   Cronyism and Congressional opposition are two possible motives.

This is not dissimilar from the gaming of the energy markets that Enron made infamous before its collapse. Financial structures based on this sort of artificial con game always collapse, given time and the latitude for their greed made possible by regulatory capture.

That is why the public should have no patience with the commodity market makers like MF Global, a TBTF bank, and even an exchange when they fail because of reckless gambling and market manipulation.

As for any complicit central bankers, regulators, and politicians, justice must be restored and prosecutions made in order to halt the growth of the moral hazard of complicity in fraud and insider trading that is now endemic, if not epidemic.

Bloomberg
Gold Lease Rate Slides to Lowest on Record as European Banks Seek Dollars
By Nicholas Larkin
Dec 8, 2011 10:55 AM ET

The interest rate for lending gold in exchange for dollars plunged to the lowest on record this week as European banks sought ways to secure the U.S. currency amid the region’s debt crisis.

The one-month lease rate on gold fell to minus 0.57 percent on Dec. 6, the lowest according to Bloomberg data going back to January 1998. The rate, derived by subtracting the gold forward offered rate from the London Interbank Offered Rate, was at minus 0.56 percent today and compares with minus 0.23 percent at the start of this year. A negative reading means banks have to pay to have their gold deposits lent.

The rate at which London-based banks say they can borrow for three months in dollars rose to the highest level in almost 2 1/2 years yesterday, even after the Federal Reserve and five other central banks agreed on Nov. 30 to cut the cost of providing dollar funding. Gold has climbed 21 percent in London this year and reached a record $1,921.15 an ounce on Sept. 6 as investors and central banks boosted holdings to protect wealth.

“European banks especially are having liquidity funding problems, which does see a lot of lending of gold and that’s putting downward pressure on lease rates,” Walter de Wet, head of commodities research at Standard Bank Plc in London, said today by phone. “Funding problems will continue for a while.”

All figures in these charts are priced in US dollars and are from the LBMA. The cumulative gold price is the daily change between London PM fixes.